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RECENT CASES
from particular situations and away from strict legalistic interpretations. 0
If this approach had been used here, the seller would have been permitted to
rescind.
The above analysis shows that the court in applying the general rule
without analyzing its effect was clearly in error. Further, the general rule
as stated is unsound, and should be altered to read: "A party who is himself
in default in performance of a contract cannot rescind for a subsequent failure
of performance having a causal connection wtih his own default." The
application of the doctrine as modified would have reached the correct solution
of allowing the seller to rescind the contract for the default of the buyer,
subject, however, to damages for late delivery of the initial installment.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EFFECT OF HEART BALM ACTS ON INFANT'S RIGHT TO SUE FOR THE
ENTICEMENT OF HIS PARENT
The mother of infant children was enticed away from the children and
family home by Hicks. By their father as next friend, the children sued
for damages resulting from the enticement. The Federal District Court
allowed the action although a Michigan heart-balm statute had abolished
actions for alienation of affections. The court reasoned that a cause of action
should be recognized in favor of the children and that the heart-balm statute,
being intended to abolish only the traditional alienation-of-affections suit,
did not bar the children's action. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, (W. D.
Mich. 1949).
In allowing the action the court surmounted two barriers: it first recognized a new cause of action to protect the children's interest in the parental
relation and then determined the action to be outside the purview of an
existing heart-balm statute.' There are indications of a trend to liberalize
tort law in favor of the infant.2 Three appellate courts, faced with facts
similar to those in this case, have upheld the infant's action for injury to
his interest in the security of the parental relation.3 But the action has been
20. The

UNIFORm REVISED SALES Acr and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

which pre-

sumably will soon be in effect in many jurisdictions are excellent examples of this
trend. See Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. 3.
1341 (1948) ; Comment, 57 YALE L. 3. 1360, 1360-1366 (1948).
1. "All civil causes of action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and
seduction of any person of the age of 18 years or more, and all causes of action for
breach of contract to marry are hereby abolished.. MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1948) § 551.301.
2. Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 618 (1949).
3. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). This decision was the first to
recognize a cause of action in the minor child where the father was enticed from the"
home. The decision provoked wide comment, and is noted in 13 U. OF CHL. L. REv. 375
(1946); 41 ILL. L. REv. 444 (1946) ; 25 CHI-KENT REv. 90 (1946); 59 HARv. L. REv. 297
(1945) ; 46 COL. L. REv. 464 (1946); 15 FORD. L. REv. 126 (1946); 30 MiNN. L. REv. 310
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denied by other courts on various grounds of public policy, 4 contrary
legislative intent,5 and the absence of precedent. 8
Some suggested theories7 upon which liability might be predicated are:
the doctrine of Luntley v. Gye,8 that a third party inducing breach of contract
is liable in tort to the promissee-here the defendant has induced the mother
to neglect her duty (founded on status rather than the traditional contract)
to her child; the broad principle of Wilkinson v. Downton,9 that unjustifiable
wilfull conduct which results in

harm to the plaintiff is actionable; the

appropriation of the child's parental relation-a distinct "relational interest"'10 ;
the loss of an expectancy."
Courts have displayed their usual reluctance to recognize a new cause
of action and have raised the usual objections thereto: the possibility of
multiplicity of actions by "everyone whose cheek is tinged by the blush of
shame,"'

2

the possibility of extortionary litigation, the inability of judges

(1946) ; 32 CORNELL L. Q. 432 (1947) ; 19 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 455 (1946) ; 32 VA. L. REV.
420 (1946).
Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E.2d 810 (1947). Here the action was
allowed despite the fact that the enticed father was furnishing support for the children
under a court order, thus indicating that the basis for the action was something other
than loss of support. This decision is commented on in 15 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 400 (1948);
25 CHI-KENT L. REV. 260 (1947); 1 Wyo. L. J. 194 (1947).
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543 (1949). Here a minor child recovered damages for the enticement of her mother from the family home. The decision
has been commented upon as having established a definite minority view that a minor child
has a cause of action against an outsider for injuries resulting from the enticement of
the parent from the family home. See notes in 28 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1949); 63 HARV.
L. REV. 541 (1950); 38 GEO. L. J. 1606 (1949) ; 29 B. U. L. REv. 538 (1949); 48 MIcH.
L. REv. 242 (1949); 34 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1949).
4. McMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (App. D. C. 1946); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn.
156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
5. Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948). Upon enactment of
the California heart-balm statute the legislature removed a section of the code which
had allowed a child to sue for the abduction of its parent.
6. Garza v. Garza, 209 S. W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Henson v. Thomas,
231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E.2d 432 (1949).
7. 13 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 375 (1946); 41 ILL. L. REV. 444 (1946); see Johnson v.
Luhman, 330 II1. App. 598, 71 N. E.2d 810, 812 (1947).
8. 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
9. (1897) 2 Q. B. 57.
10. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (1934)
Relational interests (interests in relations with other persons) are distinct interests. They extend beyond the personality, and are not
symbolized by any tangible thing which can legitimately be called
property. . . . The situation is this: plaintiff stands in some relation
to some other person; defendant hurts plaintiff's relation with that
person. Thus is a hurt done to a relational interest. Relational interests may be classified as (1) family relations; (2) trade relations;
(3) professional relations; (4) general social relations; (5) political
relations.
11. The inducement of a testator to alter his will created liability in Bohannon v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N. C. 679, 188 S. E. 390 (1936).
12. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912, 914 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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to define the child's rights and of juries to properly assess damages, and the
But other courts have reasoned that if
lack of a common law precedent.'
the enticement constitutes a legal wrong, there should be a remedy to obtain
redress,1 4 and that to deny a remedy would contravene the remedy clause of a
state constitution. : 5 It has been pointed out that there has been no flood
of litigation in cases of this kind though sufficient time has elapsed for a
reasonable trial period.' And further, there are not enough such enticements
to cause a burdensome increase in extortionary litigation' 7 ; but that even if
some extortionary suits do result, "the very purpose of the courts is to
separate the just from the unjust causes" and "in every kind of litigation some
suits are brought in bad faith."' 8
Courts recognizing the cause of action have made surprisingly little use
of legal fictions; they have preferred to recognize the modern family as "a
cooperative enterprise with mutual rights and obligations among all its
members,"' 9 as opposed to Blackstone's concept, "The child hath no property
in his father."' 0 The rule most relied upon by way of analogy has been stated
to be "that intentional interference with a relationship from which legally
unenforceable benefits flow to a party is actionable . . ."'I Justification
for allowing the action has been found in the need for a remedy to protect
the child's interest 22 in the family relationship and the power and duty of
the courts to use the rule by which the common law expanded to provide
such a remedy.

23

A conflict between judicial empiricism and judicial legislation is involved. The difficulty of resolving this conflict is illustrated in Henson v.
Thomas 24 where the majority felt that the advisability of protecting the
13. See Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543, 546 (1949).; Henson v.
Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E.2d 432, 434 (1949) ; 83 U. OF PA. L. Rev. 276 (1934).
14. Miller v. Mons'en, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
15. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 II1. App. 598, 71 N. E.2d 810, 814 (1947); see IND.
CONST. Art. I, § 12.
16. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
17. Ibid.
18. Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727, 729 (M. D. Pa. 1942).
19. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 284 (W. D. Mich. 1949).
20. 3 BL. Comm . *143.
21. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543, 548 (1949) ; see note 10 supra.
22. See Note, 162 A. L. R. 824, 825 (1946) :
No one doubts that a child has an interest in his parents' affection and
company and that the courts, under the Anglo-American system of law,
have the power to "legalize" such interest by recognizing a right of
action for its protection.
23. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Russick v. Hicks, 85
App. 598, 71
F. Supp. 281, 285-286 (W. D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill.
N. E.2d 810, 814 (1947).
24. Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E.2d 432, 424 (1949). It is significant
that neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in this case mention the case of
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543 (1949) which had been decided more
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family relation through an action by the child for the wrongful interference
therewith should be decided only by the legislature. Two dissenting judges,
however, took the position that the action satisfied every definition of actionable tort and warranted. recognition through judicial empiricism. In states
such as Indiana, where the question has not been decided, it is impossible to
predict accurately which view the appellate courts will take.21 It can only be
observed that there is now substantial authority from other jurisdictions
26
for either view.
In hurdling the Michigan heart-balm statute the court relied primarily
on the rule of construction that a statute in derogation of common law rights
should be strictly construed2 7 and advanced the argument that the Michigan
legislature could not have intended to abolish a cause of action which was
neither known nor recognized under Michigan law at the time the statute
was enacted. With equal logic the court could have applied the general rule
of statutory construction that a statute will operate prospectively so as to
include new circumstances, rights, or legal relationships unknown at the time
28

of enactment.

Indiana's heart-balm statute,2 9 like Michigan's, abolishes all civil causes
of action for alienation of affections. Unlike the Indiana statute, however,
the Michigan statute contains a proviso allowing suits against a "parent,
brother, sister, or person in loco parentis of the plaintiff's spouse" (italics
supplied) for alienation of affections. 30 From this proviso the court inferred
that the pertinent provisions of the whole statute referred only to suits by a
spouse. Since the Indiana statue makes no exceptions, and legislation is
intended to operate prospectively, any action for alienation of affections
would seem to be barred in Indiana. But if the child's action is not one for
alienation of affections and is not barred by the policy of the heart-balm
statute, it could be allowed.
than six months prior to this decision, and is probably the best reasoned case supporting
the cause of action. Miller v. 2Monsen is approved in a recent law review note which apparently was being prepared almost simultaneously with the North Carolina Supreme
Court's opinion in Henson v. Thomas. See 28 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1949).
25. See note 24 supra for an illustration of such an attempt.
26. See notes 3 to 6 supra and the Russick case.
27. This rule of statutory interpretation is applicable in Indiana. Universal Discount
Corp. v. Brooks, 115 Ind. App. 591, 594, 58 N. E.2d 369, 371 (1944) ; Helms v. American
Security Co., 216 Ind. 1, 6, 22 N. E.2d 822, 824 (1939) ; 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6201 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
28. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5102 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
29. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1946) § 2-508:
All civil causes of action for breach of promise to marry, for alienation
of affections, for criminal conversation, and for the seduction of any
female person of the age of twenty-one years or more are hereby
abolished, provided that this section shall not affect any such cause
of action heretofore accrued.
30. MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1948) § 551.302.
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In determining whether the child's action is one for alienation of affections a comparison must be made between the interests protected by the child's
action and the interests protected by the action for alienation of affections.
The child's action is designed to protect the child's interest in benefits which
normally flow from the parental relation. The three leading duties of
parents to their children are support, protection, and education. 31
Primarily, the duty to support a child rests upon the father; but the
mother, also, may be made liable for the child's support. 32 In most jurisdictions the child cannot sue the parent directly to enforce the duty of
support, but the state or a third party furnishing necessaries must bring the
action.

33

The duty to protect his child creates a privilege in the parent, when
acting for the child's protection, which may justify assault and battery or
even homicide.

34

Blackstone pronounced the duty to educate to be far the greatest of all
the parental duties." This duty plus the natural desire of the normal parent
to educate his child results in a benefit which has been assigned pecuniary
value in actions by a child for the death of a parent. 36 The courts have taken
the view that the nurture and training-physical, intellectual, and moral-normally provided by a parent are usually major factors in the welfare of the
child during its entire life. As stated in the instant case, the children are
entitled to "the intangible, although equally important, elements of affection,
companionship, moral support, and guidance from both the father and
mother. '37 It should be noted that the term "educate," as used here,
denotes much more than formal classroom training. The nurture, guidance,
emotional stability, and training received by the child at the family home
are, perhaps, the most important elements of the child's education in a broad
sense and constitute the basis for his cause of action against a stranger who
intentionally deprives him of such benefits.
The action for alienation of affections is designed to protect the marital
relation from invasion by third persons. The interest protected is said to be
the consortium-that is, the society, companionship, conjugal affections, fel31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

SCHOULER, DOIESTIC RELATIONS § 772 (6th ed., Blakemore, 1921).

State v. Troxler, 202 Ind. 268, 271, 173 N. E.2d 321, 323 (1930).
MADDEN, DOIESTIc RELATIONS §

112 (1931).

Id. § 116.
1 BL. Comma. *450.
Board of Commissioners v. Legg, 93 Ind. 523, 530-531 (1884):
The care, training and education which a father can give his children
may justly be regarded as increasing their capacity to make their way
in the world, and this capacity, surely, may be valuable even in a

pecuniary sense.

See Note, 74 A. L. R. 95 (1931).
37. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 284 (W. D. Mich. 1949).
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lowship and assistance of the spouse. 8 The action is restricted to spouses,
and the existence of a marriage relation is essential to recovery. 0 One spouse
may recover for the mere loss of the other's affections, without more; neither
separation, adultery, seduction, or loss of services is essential to recovery."
A parent cannot maintain an action for the mere loss of affections of the
child,41 however, and no decision has allowed a child to recover for the mere
loss of its parent's affections, without actual separation.
It appears that the primary basis for the alienation-of-affections action
is the protection of each spouse's interest in the conjugal affections of the
other; whereas, the basis for the child's action for the enticing away of its
parent is the protection of the child's interest in the parental relation. The
elements of companionship, society, fellowship, and assistance are common
to both the parental and marital relations. The element of education in the
broad sense, including nurture and guidance, is peculiar to the parental
relation; and the element of conjugal affections is peculiar to the marital
relation.
The four decisions allowing the child's action have not considered it to
be an alienation-of-affections action. Two4 2 of the decisions do not mention
the term alienation of affections, while the instant opinion refers to the
term only to refute the contention that the action is barred by the heart-balm
statute and proceeds to distinguish the child's action as follows:
Theirs is not the traditional alienation-of-affections suit-it is
an action to recover damages for a direct wrong to the infant plaintiffs, that is, the wrongful invasion of their family relationships and
the loss of the benefits therefrom. . . . Their right of action arose
when defendant enticed and induced their mother to desert them
and the family home ...
43
Though the Illinois court44 has used the term alienation of affections, it could
38. Gregg v. Gregg, 37 Ind. App. 210, 216, 75 N. E. 674, 676 (1905) ; KEEZER, MAR§ 190 (3d ed., Moreland, 1946).
39. See Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 556, 10 N. E.2d 619, 621 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana heart-balm act) ; Young v. Young, 236 Ala.
627, 184 So. 187 (1938) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 683, comment j (1938).
40. HARPER, TORTS § 256 (1933) ; MADDEN, DOIESTIc RELATIONS § 56 (1931); Adams
v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 235, 29 N. E. 792, 793 (1892).
41. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 682, 161 N. E. 251, 260 (1928):
But the relationship between a husband and wife is different from
that between a parent and child. The foundation of an action for the
alienation of affections brought by a husband or wife and an action
by a parent for the abduction of his minor child is not the same. The
former action is grounded upon the loss of consortium or conjugal
relations. ...
See Note 49 A. L. R. 562 (1927).
42. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400,
37 N. W.2d 543 (1949).
43. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 286-287 (W. D. Mich. 1949).
44. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E.2d 810 (1947).
RIAGE AND DIVORCE
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do so freely because the Illinois heart-balm statute had been declared uhconstitutional 4 and the cause of action was described in the complaint as one
for alienation of affections. Nowhere does the Illinois court indicate that the
child could sue for mere loss of the parent's affections. The defendant had
induced the father to leave his five children, and this was the harm which
concerned the court.4' Throughout the opinion the court indicates that it is
seeking to protect the children's interest in the security of their family unit.
The term alienation of affections appears to have been a misnomer of the
cause of action.
The policy reason for heart-balm statutes is the prevention of extortionary litigation. 47 However, the action for alienation of affections has been
characterized as the least objectionable of the actions abolished 48 ; and its
retention has been urged as a matter of policy to preserve the home.4" The
flurry of heart-balm legislation appears to have passed with only ten states50
now prohibiting the alienation-of-affections action. The Illinois act has
been held unconstitutional,5 1 and the Pennsylvania act has been criticized in a
45. Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ii. 296, 68 N. E.2d 464 (1946).
46. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810, 814 (1947):
Defendant's conduct resulted in the destruction of the children's family
unit-that fortress within which they should find comfort and protection
at least until they reach maturity-and deprived them of the unstinting
financial support heretofore contributed by their father, as well as of
the security afforded by his affection and presence.
47. The policy section of the New York statute is a typical expression of legislative
policy:
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of
actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having been subjected
to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of
any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and
such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their
unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the
commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases having
resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public
policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will
be served by the abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the
public interest, the necessity for the enactment of this article is hereby
declared as a matter of legislative determination.
N. Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 61-a.
48. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. Rrv. 979, 1008
(1935).
49. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 472, 505
(1934).
50. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 7, § 115 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-508 (Burns Repl.
1946) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2.39A (1939) ; N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 61-a; PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 48, § 170 (Purdon Supp. 1949) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 24A, § 1 (Supp. 1947) ; CAL.
CIv. CODE § 43.5 (Deering 1941); MICH. Comfp. LAws § 551.301 (1948); Wyo. ComP.
STAT. ANN. § 3-512 (1945); NEv. Comip. LAWS ANN. § 4071.01 (Supp. 1949).
51. Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E.2d 464 (1946).
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dictum " as an improper use of police power. The heart-balm acts have been
described recently as having been "conceived in a rash of newspaper publicity
and ballyhoo ....
,s The acts have been vigorously criticized by legal
54

writers.
Policy reasons

given for abolishing alienation-of-affections actions
might well be less applicable to the child's cause of action for the reasons that
greater injury to society and the family normally results where the spouse
enticed away is a parent and that there would be relatively few such suits. 5
Professor Brown56 believes that more suits for alienation of affections are
brought against parents and other very close relatives of the alienated spouse
than against any other class of persons. Suits of this type would seldom,
if ever, be brought by children. Also, sociologists seem to agree that divorce
and separation are less frequent among couples with children.17 Admitting
that the good faith and pure motives of a spouse may be questioned in many
instances, there should be ample opportunity to avoid extortionary suits by
the children if they are required to show a real loss of parental benefits caused
5 8
directly by the defendant's act.
The parent is generally allowed to sue for the enticement, abduction, or
seduction of his child 55 ; and the more recent cases hold that proof of loss of
the child's services is not essential to recovery.00 These decisions dispensing
with the fiction of loss of services indicate a recognition of the parent-child
relation as a distinct interest. The Indiana heart-balm statute does not
abolish actions for the seduction of females under twenty-one or actions for
the enticement or abduction of a child."' It would seem reasonable to grant
the child a reciprocal right to sue for the enticement of the parent.
Care should be exercised to avoid the use of the term alienation of
affections in pleadings and arguments seeking recognition of the child's
cause of action; rather, the action should be treated as one for the wrongful
52. See Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727, 729 (M. D. Pa. 1942).
53. Note, 33 VA. L. REv. 314 (1947).
54. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORD. L. REV. 63 (1936) ; Feinsinger,
Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation of Affections,
ahd Related Actions, 10 Wis. L. REV. 417 (1935).
55. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
56. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 472, 483
(1934).
57. Ogburn, Marital Separations, 49 Am.J. SOCIOLOGY 316, 319 (1944).
58. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177-178 (7th Cir. 1945). The question of whether
the child suffered any real loss by the enticement from him of a worthless parent is a
question of damages for the jury. See Note, 20 CORNELL L. Q. 255, 256-257 (1935).
59. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N. E. 251 (1928) ; Bundy v. Dodson, 28
Ind.295 (1867) ; Bolton v. Miller, 6 Ind. 262 (1855) ; HARPER, TORTS §§ 263, 264 (1933);
MADDEN, DOINESTIc RELATIONS §§ 130, 131 (1931).
60. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N. E. 251 (1928) ; see Note, 72 A. L. R.
847, 849 (1931).
61. Iun. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1946) § 2-508 et seq.
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interference with a relational interest enjoyed by the child. If the courts
can be convinced that distinctions amounting to more than mere words do
exist between the child's action for the enticement of his parent from the
family home and the spouse's action for alienation of affections, the legislative
policy of the heart-balm acts would not seem to be a compelling reason for
denying the child's action.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PROPRIETY OF A STAY IN FEDERAL COURT WHEN COMPANION STATE
COURT SUIT RUNS CONCURRENTLY
Beginning in June, 1947, nine derivative stockholders' suits on behalf of
San-Nap-Pak, Inc., alleging raids upon the corporate treasury by its directors
and others, were successively filed in the New York State Supreme Court.
Later that year the New York court consolidated the nine actions into one.
In June, 1948, Mottolese brought an identical derivative action' in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The defendants moved in the federal court to
stay the federal suit. Judge Samuel Kaufman granted the motion but without
prejudice to an application for a modification or vacation of the stay if
circumstances so warranted. Decision on a motion by defendant to prevent
Mottolese from taking depositions under the liberal federal discovery procedure was held in abeyance. The Court indicated that it would not permit
the use of discovery in the federal courts if defendants acquiesced in permitting examinations of equal scope in the state court. Mottolese petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a writ of mandamus to
compel judge Kaufman to vacate the stay. The Court of Appeals, speaking
through Chief Judge Learned Hand, denied the petition, on the ground that
since the liberal examination before trial procedure was available to the
plaintiffs in the state court by reason of the District Court's action, the possible remaining advantages which might accrue to plaintiff from a continuation
of the action in the federal court did not outweigh the disadvantage to
defendants of defending two simultaneous actions on the same claims.
Mottolese v. Kaufant, 176 F. 2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1949).
When two simultaneous suits brought in different courts involve substantially identical parties or interests and substantially the same issues,2 a
pragmatic approach would require that only one proceed to final judgment.
Such multiplicity of suits within a single jurisdiction can be readily remedied
1. The complaint in the state court set forth ten causes of action against the defendants; the Mottolese complaint stated nine. More defendants were served in the
Mottolese action, although two less were named.
2. The issues should be enough alike so that decision in one suit decides the issues of
the other. Cf. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936).

